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1 Introduction
In a very inuential paper, Shimer (2005a) argues that the Mortensen-Pissarides search model
of unemployment lacks an amplication mechanism because it cannot generate the observed
business cycle uctuations in unemployment given labor productivity shocks of plausible mag-
nitude. In this paper, I argue that close to 50% of this so-called Shimer puzzle is simply due
to the misidentication of labor productivity shocks.
In the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model of unemployment, shifts in labor demand are
caused by changes in productivity, and productivity is seen as the central driving force of
unemployment uctuations. However, Shimer (2005a) shows that when one considers pro-
ductivity changes of plausible magnitude, these are far too small to explain unemployment
uctuations. Quantitatively, the standard MP model can only explain 5% of the observed
volatility in the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
Indeed, the MP model has a weak amplication mechanism: following an increase in pro-
ductivity, the higher job-worker match surplus leads rms to post more vacancies but the higher
number of posted vacancies reduces the duration of unemployment and puts upward pressures
on the wage. In a reasonably calibrated version of the model, the wage absorbs virtually all
of the productivity increase. As a result, a productivity shock barely a¤ects unemployment,
and one needs very large productivity shocks to account for the magnitude of unemployment
uctuations.
The Shimer puzzle has attracted a lot of interest in the literature, and a number of re-
searchers have focused on ways to create more amplication so that small productivity move-
ments generate large uctuations in unemployment.1 This paper follows a di¤erent route and
claims that part of the Shimer puzzle is in fact due to the misidentication of productivity
shocks. Shimer (2005a) estimates his productivity shocks series by ltering out the trend com-
ponent of labor productivity (output per hour) with an HP-lter. His approach is consistent
1See, among others, Hagedorn and Manovski (2005) , Hall (2005), Hall and Migrom (2005), Shimer (2005b),
and Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) for a review of recent e¤orts.
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with a neoclassical setting in which productivity movements are exogenous and in which rms
labor demand responds to the marginal product of labor. However, when the rm is demand
constrained, it is aggregate demand, not the marginal product of labor, that determines the
optimal level of employment, and in Barnichon (2007), I argue that aggregate demand plays an
important role in driving unemployment uctuations. Since rms can respond to changes in de-
mand by adjusting their level of capacity utilization of inputs (capital or labor), measured labor
productivity uctuates endogenously with aggregate demand and hence unemployment. As a
result, what the MP model interprets as a causal relationship may in fact be a simple comove-
ment as unobserved true shocks (such as aggregate demand shocks) drive both unemployment
and labor productivity. The cyclical component of labor productivity does not identify the
true shocks driving unemployment but captures the small and transitory endogenous response
of measured labor productivity to some unobserved shocks. Because the endogenous response
of productivity is small, it is natural to observe that the cyclical component of measured labor
productivity uctuates less than unemployment, and part of Shimers puzzle is simply the
by-product of the endogeneity of productivity.
To quantify the proportion of Shimers puzzle due to this phenomenon, I use a calibrated
New-Keynesian model with search unemployment, and I estimate that close to 50% of the low
volatility of productivity relative to unemployment can be explained by the misidentication
of shocks. In addition, I show that extending the search model with an aggregate demand side
remarkably improves the ability of the standard search model to match the second moments
and cross-correlations of labor productivity and key labor market variables. An equilibrium
wage determined by Nash-bargaining fares relatively well whereas a wage norm such as the
one suggested by Hall (2005) is rejected by the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the Shimer puzzle
as well as statistics of key labor market variables; Section 3 describes possible explanations
for the low volatility of unemployment relative to productivity; Section 4 shows the results of
simulations using a calibrated New-Keynesian model with unemployment; and Section 5 o¤ers
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some concluding remarks.
2 The Shimer puzzle
In this section, I reproduce Shimers (2005a) exercise and show that detrended productivity is
more than twenty times less volatile than labor market tightness. Table 1 presents summary
statistics for productivity, unemployment, labor market tightness (the vacancy unemployment
ratio) and the real wage. I use quarterly data taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) covering the period 1951:Q1 to 2005:Q4. Labor productivity is measured as real average
output per hour in the non-farm business sector, and unemployment is the quarterly average
of the monthly unemployment rate series constructed by the BLS from the Current Population
Survey. Labor market tightness is dened as the vacancy-unemployment ratio and vacancies
are the quarterly average of the monthly Conference Board help-wanted advertising index.
The wage is real hourly compensation in the non-farm business sector, constructed by the BLS
from the NIPA and CES. In order to study business cycle uctuations, I remove low-frequency
movements using a standard HP-lter with  = 1600.2
As originally argued by Shimer (2005a), the volatility of productivity is only a fraction (here
less than 4%) of the volatility of labor market tightness. Note also that the real wage uctuates
as little as productivity and hence a lot less than labor market tightness or unemployment.
Turning to the correlation matrix, and unemployment and labor market tightness are weakly
correlated with productivity with correlations of respectively  0:23 and 0:19. Digging a little
deeper, Figure 1 and 2 plot the cross-correlograms between productivity and, respectively, un-
employment and labor market tightness. The peak "impact" of productivity on unemployment
and labor market tightness occurs after 2 to 3 quarters with correlations of respectively  0:50
and 0:49. Finally, the real wage is mostly acyclical but, if anything, weakly procyclical as it is
weakly correlated with productivity (0:38), negatively correlated with unemployment ( 0:23)
2This departs from Shimer (2005) who uses a less standard smoothing parameter of  = 105. However, the
results presented in this paper are robust to using a lter with a lower frequency trend (such as Shimers) or
using other ltering methods (such as the Baxter-King lter).
4
and positively correlated with labor market tightness (0:24).
In the context of a standard MP model where productivity movements are the central
driving force of unemployment uctuations, Shimer (2005a) shows that productivity has to
be as volatile as unemployment for the MP model to account for the observed magnitude of
unemployment uctuations. He estimates that productivity shocks are only 10% as volatile
as unemployment uctuations and concludes that the MP model cannot account for more
than 10% of unemployment uctuations. Furthermore, Shimer (2005a) notes that the MP
model exhibits virtually no propagation as it implies a contemporaneous correlation between
unemployment and productivity of  1 when the data show a contemporaneous and peak
unemployment-productivity correlation of respectively only  0:23 and  0:50. This point has
drawn relatively less attention from the literature but is nonetheless an important aspect of a
successful theory of unemployment uctuations.
3 Reconciling the MP model with the data
In this section, I rst review the approach followed by the literature to reconcile the MP model
with the Shimer puzzle. Then, I propose a new explanation for the low volatility of productivity
relative to unemployment.
3.1 The current approach: xing the model to add more amplication
One way to reconcile the MP model with the data is to modify the model so that it generates
more amplication, i.e. that a given shock to productivity has a larger impact on unemploy-
ment. Mortensen and Nagypal (2006) provide a detailed review of the current e¤ort in that
direction, and I will only emphasize two inuential examples. A rst possibility, suggested
by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005a), is to introduce real wage rigidity. In the standard MP
model, the Nash bargaining real wage responds so much to movements in productivity that it
e¤ectively absorbs most of the changes in productivity. As a result, the surplus of the match
responds only weakly to uctuations in productivity. By introducing a degree of real wage
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rigidity, movements in productivity have a less muted impact on the match surplus, on the
incentives of rms to post vacancies and hence on equilibrium unemployment.
Another possibility, suggested by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2004), does not rely on real
wage rigidity but uses a standard MP model with a di¤erent calibration than the one used in
Shimers. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2004) show that when the opportunity cost of employment
is high, the job nding rate becomes very responsive to changes in productivity, and the MP
model can quantitatively account for the magnitude of unemployment uctuations. While
this approach is di¤erent from the one proposed by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005a), the
underlying philosophy is the same: one needs to modify the MP model (either its equations
or its calibration) so that the surplus of the match becomes more responsive to changes in
productivity.
3.2 The misidentication of productivity shocks
The approach that I propose here is di¤erent. I argue that the Shimer puzzle is not necessarily
the symptom of some misspecication within the MP model or its calibration but simply the
result of the misidentication of shocks.
In a neoclassical setting, rms post more or fewer vacancies depending on the return of the
match. However, this needs not be the case when rms have to satisfy a given level of demand
for their products. In a New-Keynesian setting with monopolistically competitive rms and
costly price adjustment, rms may have to hire more workers when demand is unexpectedly
high even if productivity (and hence the match surplus) does not increase. Put di¤erently, the
number of posted vacancies could increase without any change in productivity. In practice,
this will not be the case because labor productivity has an endogenous component. Faced with
higher demand, rms may also respond by increasing capacity utilization of inputs (capital or
labor). As a result, measured labor productivity uctuates with aggregate demand and hence
unemployment.3
3This idea is given empirical support in Barnichon (2007), following Gali (1999).
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By taking the residual from a low-frequency trend of output per hour, Shimer (2005a) does
not identify the true productivity shocks but mostly the endogenous response of productivity
to unobserved aggregate demand shocks. And because the endogenous response of productivity
is small, it is natural to observe that the cyclical component of measured labor productivity
uctuates less than unemployment. I now present a New-Keynesian model with unemploy-
ment that allows me to capture formally this argument, and I will use a calibrated version to
quantitatively evaluate the proportion of Shimers puzzle that is due to the misidentication
of shocks.
4 A New-Keynesian model with search unemployment
I extend the MP model by introducing nominal frictions so that hiring rms are demand con-
strained in a New-Keynesian fashion. In addition, I make a distinction between the extensive
(number of workers) and the intensive (hours and e¤ort) labor margins. In this framework, un-
employment uctuations are the product of two disturbances: technology shocks and monetary
policy (or aggregate demand) shocks. By denition, positive technology shocks permanently
raise productivity.4 Positive monetary policy shocks decrease unemployment and increase mea-
sured productivity temporarily, because rms increase labor e¤ort to satisfy demand in the
short run. As a result, measured labor productivity is the product of two components: per-
manent and temporary disturbances. Filtering out the trend component of labor productivity
will not correctly identify the shocks driving unemployment but will capture the transitory
movements in productivity.
In the next subsections, I evaluate quantitatively how small these movements are in order
to quantify the fraction of Shimers puzzle that is due to the misidentication of shocks. I use
a calibrated version of my New-Keynesian model with search unemployment to simulate data
on unemployment and productivity, and I replicate Shimers exercise on these articial data.
4They also temporarily raise unemployment because with nominal rigidities, aggregate demand does not
adjust immediately to the new productivity level, and rms use less labor.
7
Finally, this exercise allows me to study the performance of the model across key labor market
variables.
4.1 The model
In this section, I present a New Keynesian model with search unemployment. The main
ingredients are monopolistic competition in the goods market, hiring frictions in the labor
market and nominal price rigidities in the form of costly price adjustment. There are three
types of agents: households, rms and a monetary authority.
4.1.1 Households
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of households of measure one. With equi-
librium unemployment, ex-ante homogenous workers become heterogeneous in the absence of
perfect income insurance because each individuals wealth di¤ers based on his employment
history. To avoid distributional issues, I follow Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) in assuming
that households are extended families that pool their income and choose per capita consump-
tion and assets holding to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Moreover, I assume that
the family employment rate is equal to the aggregate employment rate nt. In order to gener-
ate endogenous productivity, each employed family member supplies hours ht and e¤ort per
hour et to the rm. Employed workers receive the wage payment wthtet with wt the wage per
e¢ ciency unit, and unemployed workers receive unemployment benets bt = bAt with At the
aggregate technology index. Unemployment benets are taken as given by workers and rms.
Denoting g(ht; et) the individual disutility from working, the representative family seeks to
maximize
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln (Ct) + m ln(
Mt
Pt
)  ntg(ht; et)

subject to the budget constraint
Z 1
0
PitCitdi+Mt +Bt = ntwthtet + (1  nt)bt +Mt 1 + (1 + it 1)Bt 1 +t + Tt
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with m a positive constant, Mt nominal money holdings, Bt bonds holdings paying an in-
terest rate it, t aggregate prots, Tt transfers from the government and Ct the composite
consumption good index dened by
Ct =
Z 1
0
C
" 1
"
it di
 "
" 1
where Cit is the quantity of good i 2 [0; 1] consumed in period t, Pit is the price of variety i,
and " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods. The aggregate price level
is dened as Pt =
0@ 1Z
0
P 1 "it
1A
1
1 "
. The disutility from supplying hours of work ht and e¤ort
per hour et is the sum of the disutilities of the members who are employed. The individual
period disutility of labor takes the form:
g(ht; et) =
h
1 + h
h1+ht + ht
e
1 + e
e1+et
where h; e; h and e are positive constants. The last term reects disutility from exerting
e¤ort with the marginal disutility of e¤ort per hour rising with the number of hours. An
innite value for e generates the standard case with inelastic e¤ort.
4.1.2 Firms and the labor market
Each di¤erentiated good is produced by a monopolistically competitive rm using labor as the
only input. There is a continuum of large rms distributed on the unit interval. At date t,
each rm i hires nit workers to produce a quantity
yit = AtnitL

it (1)
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where At is an aggregate technology index, Lit the e¤ective labor input supplied by each worker
and 0 <  < 1. I dene e¤ective labor input as a function of hours hit and e¤ort per hour eit:
Lit = hiteit. (2)
Total e¤ective labor input can be adjusted through three channels: the extensive margin nit,
and the two intensive margins: hours hit and e¤ort per hour eit. With variable e¤ort, the
model will be able to generate endogenous procyclical movements in productivity.
Being a monopolistic producer, the rm faces a downward sloping demand curve ydit =
(PitPt )
 "Yt and chooses its price Pit to maximize its value function given the aggregate price
level Pt and aggregate output Yt. When changing their price, rms face quadratic adjustment
costs 2

Pi;t
Pi;t 1   
2
with  > 0 and  the steady-state level of ination.
In a search and matching model of the labor market, workers cannot be hired instanta-
neously and must be hired from the unemployment pool through a costly and time-consuming
job creation process. Firms post vacancies at a unitary cost, ct = cAt, and unemployed work-
ers search for jobs. Vacancies are matched to searching workers at a rate that depends on the
number of searchers on each side of the market. I assume that the matching function takes the
usual Cobb-Douglas form so that the ow mt of successful matches within period t is given by
mt = m0u

t v
1 
t
where m0 is a positive constant,  2 (0; 1), ut denotes the number of unemployed and
vt=
R 1
0 vitdi the total number of vacancies posted by all rms. Accordingly, the probability
of a vacancy being lled in the next period is q(t)  m(ut; vt)=vt = m0  where t  vtut
is the labor market tightness. Similarly, the probability for an unemployed to nd a job is
m(ut; vt)=ut = m0
1 
t . Matches are destroyed at a constant rate , and the law of motion for
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a representative rm is given by
nit+1 = (1  )nit + q(t)vi;t.
When a rm and a worker meet, they must decide on the allocation of hours and e¤ort to
satisfy demand. I assume that both parties negotiate the hours/e¤ort decision by choosing the
optimal allocation and set hours and e¤ort per hour to satisfy demand at the lowest utility
cost for the worker. More precisely, they solve
min
hit;eit
h
1 + h
h1+hit + hit
e
1 + e
e1+eit (3)
subject to satisfying demand Atnithite

it = y
d
it at date t, and this implies that e¤ort per hour
is a function of total hours
eit = e0h
h
1+e
it (4)
where e0 =

1+e
e
h
e
 1
1+e is a positive constant. Thus, changes in hours can proxy for changes
in e¤ort, and I can write a reduced-form relationship between output and hours
yit = y0Atnith
'
it
with y0 = e0 and ' = 

1 + h1+e

. For ' > 1, the production function displays short
run increasing returns to hours, and endogenous labor productivity (i.e. output per hour)
movements are procyclical.
4.1.3 Wage bill setting
Firms and workers take the market real wage wt as given. The equilibrium real wage is
determined by Nash-bargaining between a representative rm and a representative worker but
I allow for the possibility of real wage rigidity, so that the market wage is described by a simple
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partial adjustment model:5
ln

wt
At

= $: ln

wnbt
At

+ (1 $) ln

wt 1
At 1

(5)
where $ 2 [0; 1] and wnbt is the Nash-bargaining wage. Denoting  the bargaining power of
the worker, one can show that the Nash-bargaining wage of the representative match takes the
form
wnbt hiteit = 

Pit
Pt
yit
nit
+ ctt

+ (1  )

bt + g0yth
1+h
it

(6)
with g0 =
h
1+h
+ e1+e e
1+e
0 .
4.1.4 The rms problem
Given the market wage and aggregate price level, rm i will choose a sequence of price fPitg
and vacancies fvitg to maximize the expected present discounted value of future prots subject
to the demand constraint, the hours/e¤ort choice and the law of motion for employment.
Formally, the rm maximizes its value
Et
X
j
j
u0(ct+j)
u0(ct)
"
Pi;t+j
Pt+j
ydi;t+j   ni;t+jhi;t+jei;t+jwt   cAtvi;t+j  

2

Pi;t+j
Pi;t+j 1
  
2
Yt
#
subject to the hours/e¤ort choice
eit = e0h
h
1+e
it
the demand constraint
ydit = Atnith
'
it = (
Pi;t
Pt
) "Yt
and the law of motion for employment
nit+1 = (1  )nit + q(t)vit:
5Blanchard and Gali (2005) or Cristo¤el and Linzert (2005) follow a similar approach to introduce real wage
rigidity.
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4.1.5 Technological progress and the central bank
Technology is comprised of a deterministic and a stochastic component: At = At ~At with
At
At 1
= ea and ~At = eat with at = at 1 + "at and "at  N(0; a): "at is a technology shock with
a permanent impact on productivity.
Consistent with a growing economy and zero ination in "steady-state", the quantity of
money M s evolves according to Mt = Mt ~Mt with
Mt
Mt 1
= ea and ~Mt = emt with mt =
mmt 1+ "mt +  cb"at , m 2 [0; 1] and "mt  N(0; m): I interpret "mt as an aggregate demand
shock. As in Gali (1999), when  cb 6= 0, the monetary authority responds in a systematic
fashion to technology shocks.
4.1.6 Closing and solving the model
Since rms are homogenous, in equilibrium nit = nt, Pit = Pt, yit = yt, and total employment
evolves according to nt+1 = (1  )nt + vtq(t): The labor force being normalized to one, the
number of unemployed workers is ut = 1   nt. Finally, assuming that vacancy posting costs
are distributed to the aggregate households, Ct = Yt in equilibrium. To solve the model, I
log-linearize the rst-order conditions around the (zero-ination) long run equilibrium.6
4.2 Calibration
I now discuss the calibration of the parameters of the model. I set the quarterly discount
factor  to 0:99 and the matching function elasticity to  = 0:4 as measured by Blanchard
and Diamond (1994). The scale parameter of the matching function m0 is chosen such that,
as reported in den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), a rm lls a vacancy with probability
q() = 0:7 and, as reported by Shimer (2005b) and used in Shimer (2005a), a worker nds a
job with probability q() = 0:6.7 Following Shimer (2005a), the separation rate is 10% so
jobs last for about 2.5 years on average. The income replacement ratio is set to 40% of mean
6The equations are presented in the Appendix.
7den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) use a lower value q() = 0:45 but the main results do not rely on
this particular choice of calibration.
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income so that b = 0:4whe. I assume that the mark-up of prices over marginal costs is on
average 10 percent. This amounts to setting " equal to 11. I set the growth rate of technology
(and money supply) to a = 0:5% a quarter so that the economy is growing by 2% on average
each year. Turning the money supply, I use a money growth autocorrelation parameter m
of 0.6, in line with the rst autocorrelations of M1 and M2 growth in the US. The standard
deviations of technology shocks and monetary policy shocks a and m are chosen to match
the average standard deviations of technology shocks and non-technology shocks identied in
Barnichon (2007) over 1948-2005. Finally, I set the price adjustment cost parameter  to 100
so that the Phillips curve coe¢ cient  = 0:10, and as estimated in Barnichon (2007), I set the
short run scale parameter of the production function ' to 1:30 and the degree of monetary
policy accommodation  cb to  0:43.
I now consider three calibration exercises with di¤erent degrees of real wage rigidity, and I
study the moment properties of the simulated data.
4.3 Simulation with a exible Nash-bargaining real wage
In order to make the case that real wage rigidity is not at play here, and that the low volatility
of productivity shocks is due to the misidentication of the shocks, I start with a simulation
that uses a exible Nash-bargained real wage ($ = 0). Figure 3 and 4 show the impulse
response functions, and Table 2 presents the results of the simulation. Despite a standard
calibration and the assumption of full wage exibility, the labor market tightness is 12.5 times
more volatile than labor productivity. This result is striking; in US data, labor market tightness
is 25 times more volatile than productivity, so this means that close to 50% of Shimers puzzle
can be accounted for by the misidentication of shocks. Interestingly, this nding is in line
with the work by Pissarides (2007) who reconsiders the Shimer puzzle in the context of an
MP model with endogenous job destruction. Pissarides (2007) reestimates the unemployment
volatility puzzle downwards and claims that with endogenous job destruction, the model
fails to account for about half to two thirds of the volatility in unemployment instead of
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the 90% originally estimated by Shimer (2005). But if 50% of the Shimer puzzle is due to
the misidentication of productivity shocks and another 30 to 50% is due to the omission of
endogenous job destruction, this means that the original puzzle is close to being fully resolved.
With full wage exibility, the real wage appears slightly too volatile and too procyclical. It
uctuates 1:4 times more than in US data, and it comoves strongly with productivity with a
correlation of 0:81 instead of 0:38 in US data. This can also be seen in Figure 3 and 4 where the
real wage responds strongly to shocks. However, Pissarides (2007) questions Shimers (2004,
2005a) use of an aggregate wage series as a benchmark to evaluate the search and matching
model. In the MP model, job creation is determined by the expected cost of labor which
depends on the wage in new matches, not on the wage in continuing matches. Reviewing
the microeconometric studies on wages in new jobs, Pissarides (2007) nds a very procyclical
"new job" wage with a wage-productivity elasticity close to 0:95. In this context, the strong
procyclicality of the simulated wage cannot be used as a criteria to reject the model.
4.4 Simulation with rigidities in Nash-bargaining real wage
When prices are fully exible (i.e. costless to adjust), the model should reduce to a standard
neoclassical MP model. However, with vacancy posting costs and unemployment benets
proportional to the technology index, the Nash-bargaining wage becomes proportional to At.
As a result, a positive technology shock leaves the unemployment rate unchanged because the
wage increase absorbs all of the surplus and leaves the rms prot unchanged. This property is
not satisfactory as it is at odds with the search literature that views unemployment uctuations
originating mainly in exogenous labor productivity changes. Hence, I now impose $ = 0:75
implying an average duration of real wages of one year. With real wage rigidity, the rms
surplus increases temporarily following a positive technology shock, and the model is consistent
with the MP model.
Figure 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions, and Table 3 present the results of
the simulation. This time the real wage has a standard deviation of 0:009 and a correlation
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with productivity of 0:37; values that are close to the ones observed in US data. In other
dimensions, the model also performs remarkably well as the cross-correlations have the right
signs and are not far o¤ the true values. In particular, unemployment is only weakly correlated
with productivity ( 0:12). Again, because the MP model exhibits virtually no propagation, the
various simulations from Shimer (2005a, 2005b) cannot account for this weak contemporaneous
correlation. On the other hand, as Figure 5 shows, a search model extended with an aggregate
demand side and technology and aggregate demand shocks is remarkably successful at matching
the cross-correlogram between unemployment and productivity. However, we can see in Figure
6 that if the simulated productivity-labor market tightness cross-correlogram resembles its
empirical counterpart, the simulated contemporaneous correlation is too high and labor market
tightness lacks persistence. In the model, rms can adjust vacancies immediately, and the
vacancy-unemployment ratio does not display enough persistence because of this excessively
rapid response of vacancies. Indeed, looking at Table 3, we can see that the simulated labor
market tightness autocorrelation parameter is 0:73 instead of 0:89 for US data. This problem
was already pointed out by Ramey and Fujita (2004) and incorporating sunk costs for vacancy
creation as in Ramey and Fujita (2004) would presumably correct this shortcoming.
4.5 Simulation with a wage norm
For the last calibration exercise, I depart from the Nash-bargaining assumption and consider
instead the case of a wage norm (in the sense of Hall, 2005) in which the real wage does not
respond to transitory aggregate disturbances (such as nominal shocks) but adjusts progressively
to permanent shocks (such as technology shocks) with $ = 0:75. In the absence of a consensus
regarding the specication of the wage, it is interesting to study how well Halls wage norm
fares at matching the data. In addition, if this real wage specication is arguably ad-hoc, it
has the merit of being consistent with the empirical evidence. Edge, Laubach and Williams
(2003) show that the real wage responds progressively to technology shocks but is virtually
insensitive to monetary policy shocks. As Figure 3 and 4 show, the behavior of the wage norm
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is now consistent with this evidence.8
Table 4 shows the results of the simulation. A general observation is that, for statistics
independent of the wage, the results are not drastically changed by the real wage specication,
and Table 4 and 5 look relatively similar. Because of real wage rigidity, the model now displays
more persistence following a monetary shock (Figure 4). However, the main conclusion from
this exercise is that a wage norm cannot match the data. It is not volatile enough with a
standard deviation of only 0:005, and it is marginally countercyclical as the unemployment-
wage correlation equals 0:15. Even with large condence intervals, this is in contradiction
with the empirical correlation of  0:23: Similarly, the wage-labor market tightness correlation
is now counterfactually countercyclical. Finally, note that using wages in new jobs as the
relevant wage measure does not change the main conclusion. The wage norm is still rejected
by the data since Pissarides (2007) observes that wages in new jobs are negatively correlated
with unemployment.
These simulations show two sets of results. First, around 50% of the low volatility of
productivity shocks relative to unemployment uctuations can be explained by the misidenti-
cation of shocks. Second, an MP model extended with an aggregate demand side fares better
than a standard MP model at matching the moments of key labor market variables. The
Nash-bargaining wage with real rigidities fares remarkably well at matching the data except
for the unemployment-wage correlation: the real wage is too procyclical and too responsive to
aggregate demand shocks. A wage norm such as the one suggested by Hall (2005) cannot match
the volatility and cyclicality of the real wage as it uctuates too little and is counterfactually
countercyclical.
8Looking at Figure 3, a perhaps surprising result is the fact that the impulse responses to technology shocks
look similar under a rigid wage norm and under a exible Nash bargaining wage. Following a positive technology
shock, the real wage increases faster under wage exibility. However, the increase in unemployment dampens
the increase in the real wage in the case of Nash-bargaining. Because of this feedback e¤ect, the Nash-bargaining
wage adjusts only slowly to technology shocks. In my calibration, the Nash-bargaining wage behaves like a wage
norm with $ = 0:75 and as a result the impulse responses to technology shocks look very similar. However,
this result is a coincidence and disappears when $ 6= 0:75:
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5 Conclusion
Shimer (2005a) claims that the Mortensen-Pissarides search model of unemployment lacks an
amplication mechanism because it cannot generate the observed business cycle uctuations
in unemployment given labor productivity shocks of plausible magnitude.
In this paper, I show that because of the endogeneity of measured labor productivity, lter-
ing out the trend component of output per hour as in Shimer (2005a) does not correctly identify
the shocks driving unemployment. In fact, isolating the cyclical component of productivity
mostly captures the small and transitory endogenous response of measured labor productivity
to unobserved true shocks (such as aggregate demand shocks). Using a calibrated version of a
New-Keynesian model with search unemployment, I estimate that close to 50% of the Shimer
puzzle is due to the misidentication of productivity shocks.
In addition, I show that extending the search model with an aggregate demand side re-
markably improves the ability of the standard search model to match the second moments and
cross-correlations of labor productivity and key labor market variables. An equilibrium wage
determined by Nash-bargaining fares relatively well whereas a wage norm (in the sense of Hall,
2005) is rejected by the data.
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Appendix
Log-linearized equilibrium dynamics
To analyze the behavior of the economy with real wage rigidity and costly price adjustment, I
log-linearize the rst-order conditions around the (zero-ination) long run equilibrium.
Since rms are homogenous, I can drop the i index from the equations, and the log-linearized
job posting condition takes the form
c
q()
^t = Et

^t+1 +
c(1  )
q()
^t+1

+
c
q()
Et (y^t   y^t+1)
with the average value of a marginal worker ^t is given by
^t = w^t +  (y^t   n^t)
and where ^t = ln
 
t


, n^t = ln
 
nt
n

and y^t = ln

Yt=At
y

are the log-deviations of rescaled
variables from their long-run equilibrium values denoted by stars. Each rm posts vacancies
until the expected cost of hiring a worker (the left-hand side) equals the expected discounted
future benets

it+j
	1
j=1
from an extra worker (the right-hand side).
The log-linearized price setting condition yields the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve
t = s^t + Ett+1
with  = " 1 and the rms real marginal cost s^t given by
s^t = w^t + (   1) (y^t   n^t)
The log-linearized law of motion for the wage is
w^t = $:w^
nb
t + (1 $)w^t 1   (1 $)"at
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with w^t = ln

wmt =At
w

the log-deviation of the rescaled wage from its long run equilibrium
value and w^nbt = ln

wmt =At
w

the log-linearized Nash-bargaining wage given by
w^NBt = c^t + !yy^t   !nn^t
with !y = 1(1 (1 )b0)whe
y
n + (1  )2+h1+hhh1+hy   (1  (1  )b0)
whe

and !n = 1(1 (1 )b0)whe
 
 yn + (1  )hh1+hy   (1  (1  )b0) w
he


:
Log-linearizing the rst-order conditions for the household and denoting m^t = ln

Mt=PtAt
(M=P )

the log-deviation of real rescaled money from its constant value in the zero-ination equilibrium,
I get y^t = Ety^t+1   (^{t   Ett+1) and m^t = y^t   i{^t with {^t = ln

1+it
1+i

:
Finally, the log-linearized law of motion for employment can be written
n^t+1 = (1    q())n^t + 1  n
n
(1  ):q()^t.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Quarterly US Data, 1951-2005
u v/u w p
Standard deviation 0.007 0.257 0.010 0.010
Quarterly
autocorrelation 0.88 0.89 0.81 0.69
u 1 -0.97 -0.23 -0.23
v/u - -1 0.24 0.19
w - - 1 0.38Correlation matrix
p 1
Notes: Seasonally adjusted unemployment u is constructed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally adjusted
help-wanted advertising index v is constructed by the Conference Board. The wage w is real hourly compensation in the non-farm business
sector, constructed by the BLS from the NIPA and CES. Average labor productivity p is seasonally adjusted real average output per person in
the non-farm business sector, constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the National Income and Product Accounts and the
Current Employment Statistics. Except for u, all variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter
1600.
Table 2: Model-generated data, Simulation with flexible wage
u v/u w p
Standard deviation 0.009(0.008, 0.011)
0.118
(0.102, 0.137)
0.014
(0.013, 0.017)
0.009
(0.008, 0.011)
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.84(0.79, 0.88)
0.72
(0.63, 0.80)
0.74
(0.68, 0.80)
0.62
(0.52, 0.71)
u 1 -0.71(-0.78, -0.62)
-0.54
(-0.65, -0.44)
-0.08
(-0.24, -0.08)
v/u - -1 0.73(0.64, 0.81)
0.44
(0.30, 0.57)
w - - 1 0.81(0.74, 0.86)
Correlation matrix
p - - - 1
Notes: Numbers in parentheses indicate the 90% confidence interval calculated with 5000 model simulations.
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Table 3: Model-generated data, Simulation with staggered one year contract for real wages
u v/u w p
Standard deviation 0.009(0.008, 0.011)
0.117
(0.102, 0.133)
0.009
(0.007, 0.011)
0.010
(0.008, 0.011)
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.84(0.79, 0.88)
0.73
(0.65, 0.79)
0.92
(0.90, 0.94)
0.65
(0.55, 0.73)
u 1 -0.71(-0.77, -0.63)
-0.71
(-0.81, -0.60)
-0.12
(-0.27, 0.01)
v/u - -1 0.52(0.40, 0.63)
0.47
(0.34, 0.60)
w - - 1 0.37(0.24, 0.50)
Correlation matrix
p - - - 1
Notes: Numbers in parentheses indicate the 90% confidence interval calculated with 5000 model simulations.
Table 4: Model-generated data, Simulation with real wage norm
u v/u w p
Standard deviation 0.010(0.008, 0.012)
0.128
(0.107, 0.150)
0.005
(0.004, 0.006)
0.009
(0.008, 0.011)
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.89(0.84, 0.92)
0.80
(0.73, 0.86)
0.93
(0.90, 0.95)
0.66
(0.56, 0.73)
u 1 -0.79(-0.85, -0.71)
0.12
(-0.09, 0.34)
-0.14
(-0.29, 0.01)
v/u - 1 -0.05(-0.25, 0.16)
0.42
(0.28, 0.56)
w - - 1 0.60(0.47, 0.71)
Correlation matrix
p - - - 1
Notes: Numbers in parentheses indicate the 90% confidence interval calculated with 5000 model simulations.
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Figure 1: Empirical cross-correlogram of Productivity and Unemployment. 1951:Q1-2005-Q4
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Figure 2: Empirical cross-correlogram of Productivity and Labor Market Tightness. 1951:Q1-
2005-Q4.
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Figure 3: Model impulse response functions to a positive technology shock under di¤erent
calibrations. The plain lines show estimates using a Nash-bargaining wage with $ = 0:75,
circled lines using a Nash-bargaining wage with $ = 0 and squared lines using a wage norm
with $ = 0:75.
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Figure 4: Model impulse response functions to a positive monetary policy shock under di¤erent
calibrations. The plain lines show estimates using a Nash-bargaining wage with $ = 0:75,
circled lines using a Nash-bargaining wage with $ = 0 and squared lines using a wage norm
with $ = 0:75.
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Figure 5: Model (foreground) and empirical (background) cross-correlogram of Productivity
and Unemployment. 1951:Q1-2005-Q4.
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Figure 6: Model (foreground) and empirical (background) cross-correlogram of Productivity
and Labor Market Tightness. 1951:Q1-2005-Q4.
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